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“A DISTINCTION WITHOUT A DIFFERENCE”?:
BARTLETT GOING FORWARD
Steven A. Schwartz*
This Note addresses the question of whether federal law preempts state
design defect claims against generic drug manufacturers regardless of
which test state law uses to determine whether a drug is defective. This
issue, arising out of the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of preemption
jurisprudence and fundamental tort law as stated in Mutual Pharmaceutical
Co. v. Bartlett, is significant because it plays a large role in determining to
what extent generic drug manufacturers are immune to civil liability arising
out of injuries caused by their generic drugs. In an age of rising medical
costs and jury awards, both plaintiff and defendant, and the political arena,
are considerable stakeholders.
First, this Note provides an overview of the battle over the Food and
Drug Administration’s (FDA) regulatory authority, preemption
jurisprudence (highlighting physical impossibility preemption), design
defect law, and relevant Supreme Court jurisprudence. Second, this Note
introduces the conflict among the lower courts as to whether the type of test
a jurisdiction uses to determine a product’s defectiveness plays any role in
an analysis of applicable FDA regulations’ preemptory effect on state
design defect law. Finally, this Note concludes that after Bartlett, so long
as state design defect law adheres to strict liability principles, federal law
preempts state design defect causes of action against generic drug
manufacturers.
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INTRODUCTION
In November 2006, Denise Neeley was prescribed the prescription drug
Reglan to treat her gastroesphageal reflux disease1 (GERD). GERD, which
is essentially severe or chronic acid reflux disease or heartburn,2 is a
common ailment that affects approximately 5 to 7 percent of the
population.3 Although Neeley’s prescription called for her to receive the
brand name version of the drug, she was provided with, and ultimately only
ingested, metoclopramide (MCP), a generic version produced by various
drug manufacturers.4 In April 2010, Neeley was diagnosed with the disease
tardive dyskinesia, allegedly due to ingesting MCP.5 Tardive dyskinesia is
a disease commonly associated with involuntary movements in the face.6
Neeley allegedly experienced abnormal and inadvertent body movements,
pain, breathing issues, and weight loss.7
Following her injuries, Neeley sued the generic drug manufacturers that
produced MCP, alleging that MCP had a design defect.8 The generic drug
manufacturers, however, argued that federal law preempted state design
defect claims against generic drug manufacturers.9 The Eastern District of
Missouri held that federal law did not preempt these claims and hence
Neeley’s design defect suit against the generic manufacturers could

1. See Neeley v. Wolters Kluwer Health, Inc., No. 4:11-CV-325 JAR, 2013 WL
3929059, at *1 (E.D. Mo. July 29, 2013).
2. Heartburn/GERD Health Center, WEBMD, http://www.webmd.com/heartburngerd/guide/heartburn-gerd-basic-information-causes (last visited Sept. 27, 2015)
[http://perma.cc/QB8P-CCQY].
3. Press Release, Int’l Found. for Functional Gastrointestinal Disorders, GERD Costs
America Nearly $2 Billion Each Week in Lost Productivity (Nov. 2005),
http://www.iffgd.org/site/news-events/press-releases/2005-1125-gerd-costs [http://perma.cc/
UPU7-G9EY].
4. See Neeley, 2013 WL 3929059, at *1.
5. See id.; Second Amended Complaint at 19 ¶ 99, Neeley, 2013 WL 3929059 (No.
4:11-CV-325).
6. Tardive dyskinesia, STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY (27th ed. 2000).
7. See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 5, at 16 ¶ 82.
8. See id. at 23 ¶ 123.
9. See Neeley, 2013 WL 3929059, at *7.
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proceed.10 Therefore, Neeley could have her claims adjudicated and
potentially receive a sizeable settlement or jury award to compensate her for
her injuries.11
This result lies in sharp contrast with the experience of Lirlene GardleyStarks, who was prescribed and ingested MCP, just like Neeley.12 She too
claimed to have developed tardive dyskinesia.13 She then sued various drug
manufacturers, including four generic drug manufacturers, alleging they
produced a drug with a design defect.14
Despite the striking similarities between Neeley’s and Gardley-Starks’s
claims, the Northern District of Mississippi held that federal law did
preempt Gardley-Starks’s design defect claim.15 Even though Neeley and
Gardley-Starks alleged that they took the same generic drug and it caused
the same ailment, Gardley-Starks had no opportunity to receive a jury
award or settlement, while Neeley did.
In reaching these disparate results, both courts relied on the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett,16
which held that federal law preempted design defect claims under New
Hampshire law pursuant to the doctrine of physical impossibility because it
would be impossible for generic drug manufacturers to both comply with
state requirements and federal requirements.17 Since Bartlett, some lower
courts, such as those in Neeley’s and Gardley-Starks’s cases, have
disagreed over whether the test that state design defect law uses to
determine if a product is defective should affect the analysis of whether the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulations preempt state design
defect law.18 In Bartlett, the Court evaluated New Hampshire’s design
defect law, which applies the risk-utility test to determine whether a product
is defective.19 However, not all jurisdictions use the risk-utility test; some
jurisdictions apply the consumer expectations test.20 Furthermore, even
those jurisdictions that do use the risk-utility test do not always apply it the
same way that New Hampshire does.21 Instead, some courts apply slight
variations of the risk-utility test.22 These variations evaluate different

10. See id. at *10.
11. See, e.g., Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2474 (2013)
(awarding plaintiff twenty-one million dollars in compensatory damages by jury for design
defect lawsuit against generic drug manufacturer).
12. See Gardley-Starks v. Pfizer, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 2d 597, 600 (N.D. Miss. 2013), aff’d
No. 4:10–CV–099–SA–JMV, 2013 WL 5423951 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 26, 2013).
13. See id.
14. See id. at 599–601, 611.
15. See Gardley-Starks, 2013 WL 5423951, at *3.
16. 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013).
17. See id. at 2473.
18. See infra Part II.A–B.
19. See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2474–75.
20. See infra Part I.C.1 (discussing development and use of consumer expectations test).
21. See infra Part I.C.3 (discussing development and use of variations of the risk-utility
test).
22. See infra Part I.C.3.
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factors23 and consider the knowledge that the manufacturer will be assumed
to have known.24
After Bartlett, if a state’s design defect test does not make a difference,
FDA regulations—which constitute federal law25—preempt state design
defect lawsuits against generic drug manufacturers by injured consumers,
severely inhibiting the injured consumer’s ability to recover monetary
damages for injuries.26 If a state’s design defect test does make a
difference, the consumer’s ability to recover monetary damages perhaps
will not be as bleak.27
The majority of the courts that have addressed this issue hold that federal
law preempts state design defect lawsuits against generic drug
manufacturers regardless of the test that the jurisdiction uses to determine
defectiveness of a drug.28 These courts hold, as stated by the Southern
District of Illinois, that the characteristics of the different design defect tests
are a “distinction without a difference.”29
This result, however, has not been unanimous. The Eighth Circuit, the
Eastern District of Missouri, the Illinois Appellate Court, and the
Pennsylvania Superior Court have each found that the differences between
the design defect test used creates a distinction that may preclude FDA
regulations from preempting design defect suits against generic drug
manufacturers.30
This Note analyzes the various design defect regimes within the
impossibility preemption framework expanded upon by Bartlett and
determines whether there really is a “distinction without a difference.” Part
I provides an overview of the current state of the FDA’s authority, federal
preemption
jurisprudence
(ultimately
highlighting
impossibility
preemption), the various tests that jurisdictions use to determine whether a
product is defective, and, finally, the Supreme Court cases Wyeth v.
Levine,31 PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing,32 and Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v.
Bartlett.33 Part II describes the division in the lower courts stemming from
23. See infra Part I.C.3.a (discussing alternative design requirement); infra Part I.C.3.c
(discussing Restatement (Third): Products Liability’s version of the risk-utility test).
24. See infra Part I.C.3.b (discussing prudent manufacturer test).
25. See Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2476 (2013).
26. See infra Part II.B. But see In re Darvocet, Darvon, and Proproxyphene Prods. Liab.
Litig., 756 F.3d 917, 929–30 (6th Cir. 2014) (discussing “parallel misbranding” theory);
Conte v. Wyeth, 168 Cal. App. 4th 89, 109–11 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (adopting “pioneer
liability”).
27. See infra Part II.A (discussing cases in which FDA regulations were found not to
preempt state design defect law).
28. See infra Part II.B (discussing cases in which FDA regulations were found to
preempt state design defect law).
29. In re Yasmin & Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Prods. Liab. Litig., No.
3:13–cv–10143–DRH–PMF, 2014 WL 1632149, at *9 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 24, 2014).
30. See infra Part II.A.
31. 555 U.S. 555 (2009).
32. 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011).
33. 133 U.S. 2466 (2013). In 2013, following Bartlett, the FDA proposed new generic
drug labeling rules. Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved
Drugs and Biological Products, 78 Fed. Reg. 67,985 (proposed Nov. 13, 2013) (to be
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Bartlett’s treatment of New Hampshire’s design defect regime. Part II then
introduces commentary regarding this lower court split. Part III resolves
this conflict by analyzing the doctrinal interaction between strict liability
and preemption in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Bartlett and
general tort law principles. Lastly, Part III concludes by discussing the
ramifications of this analysis.
I. PREEMPTION AND DESIGN DEFECT TESTS
Part I of this Note provides background on the legal principles involved
in Bartlett. Part I.A tracks the FDA’s recent battle over preemption. Part
I.B discusses the fundamentals of preemption law, highlighting physical
impossibility conflict preemption. Part I.C discusses design defect law.
Finally, Part I.D examines two important cases leading up to Bartlett—
Levine and Mensing—and then Bartlett itself.
A. The Political Background of the FDA’s Authority over the State
At a 2002 symposium hosted by the Food and Drug Law Institute, Daniel
Troy suggested that because the FDA holds “broad authority” to regulate
drug labeling under the Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act (FDCA), this dual
layer of coverage created the risk of parties having inconsistent obligations
under the FDCA and state law.34 In December 2003, at a drug and medical
device litigation conference, Troy told the audience to recommend lawsuits
in which the FDA might be able to intervene—make them “sound like a
Hollywood pitch.”35 What made Troy’s actions significant was his
occupation: Chief Counsel of the FDA.36
Around this time, the FDA filed unsolicited amicus briefs in various
cases, expressing the view that the FDA impliedly preempted state law.37
One of these briefs, for example, argued “the prospect of hundreds of
individual juries determining the propriety of particular device approvals, or
the appropriate standards to apply to those approvals, is the antithesis of the
orderly scheme Congress put in place and charged FDA with
implementing.”38
The FDA’s position in these briefs was contrary to its position just a few
years earlier. Previously, then-FDA Chief Counsel Margaret Jane Porter
indicated that the “FDA’s view is that FDA product approval and state tort
codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 314 and 601). The implications of the potential adoption of these
rules are outside the scope of this Note. As of the date of publication, these rules have not
been approved.
34. Margaret H. Clune, Stealth Tort Reform: How the Bush Administration’s Aggressive
Use of the Preemption Doctrine Hurts Consumers, CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM 2 (Oct.
2004), http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/preemption.pdf [http://perma.cc/EH7277D3].
35. Id.
36. See id. at 1–2.
37. See id. at 4–7.
38. Statement of Interest of the United States of America, Murphree v. Pacesetter, No.
005429-00-3 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Dec. 12, 2003), cited and quoted in Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376
F.3d 163, 171 n.13, 178 (3d Cir. 2004); see Clune, supra note 34, at 4.
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liability usually operate independently, each providing a significant, yet
distinct, layer of consumer protection.”39 This view was similarly posited
in an FDA amicus brief in 1996.40
The administration of President George W. Bush justified the FDA’s
changing view on a new cost-benefit analysis.41 The FDA argued that it
was now properly calculating for the risk added by the FDA’s regulatory
measures, in addition to the actual risk associated with the devices.42 Tort
reform was a policy goal of President Bush.43 As Governor of Texas,
President Bush helped to enact seven tort reform bills, one of which made it
more difficult for plaintiffs to receive punitive damages by increasing the
burden of proof and reducing punitive damage liability.44 President Bush
argued that product liability tort lawsuits increase prices in the healthcare
sector and thus burden the economy as a whole.45
This policy followed Bush into the White House and would become one
of the goals of his administration.46 President Bush attempted to achieve
this goal through federal legislation47 and by having the government submit
amicus briefs in medical drug and device litigation, to mixed success.48
In 2006, the FDA published a formal statement in the Federal Register
discussing the extent of the FDA’s preemptive reach.49 In particular, this
statement stated that it was necessary for FDA regulations to preempt state
products liability lawsuits in order to ensure that state tort lawsuits did not

39. Margaret Jane Porter, The Lohr Decision: FDA Perspective and Position, 52 FOOD
& DRUG L.J. 7, 11 (1997).
40. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Smith Indus. Med. Sys., Inc. v.
Kernats, No. 96-1405, 1997 WL 33561767 (1997); see Clune, supra note 34, at 2.
41. See Clune, supra note 34, at 7.
42. See id. at 7–8.
43. See id. at 8.
44. See id.
45. See id.; Jordyn K. McAfee, Medical Malpractice Crisis Factional or Fictional?: An
Overview of the GAO Report as Interpreted by the Proponents and Opponents of Tort
Reform, 9 J. MED. & L. 161, 166 (2005) (“President Bush maintains that the high costs of
medical malpractice premiums are due to excessive damage awards . . . . [I]f there are caps
that disallow high damage awards it would lead to a decrease of medical malpractice
premiums.”).
46. See Michele E. Gilman, Presidents, Preemption, and the States, 26 CONST.
COMMENT. 339, 351 (2010).
47. See McAfee, supra note 45, at 164–66 (discussing Bush’s then-proposed federal
legislation); see also BRADLEY M. JONES & MARY BYRNE FLETCHER, MEAGHER & GEER
PLLP, HOW THE LITIGATION CLIMATE IN THE USA HAS CHANGED SINCE OBAMA BECAME
PRESIDENT AND THE DEMOCRATS TOOK CONTROL OF CONGRESS 9 (2009),
http://www.meagher.com/files/upload/acb.pdf (arguing that the only significant Bush tort
reform legislation was the Class Action Fairness Act, and the Bush Administration’s tort
reform successes derived from state legislation and federal court rulings)
[http://perma.cc/7BBB-NTDG].
48. See James M. Beck, Federal Preemption in FDA-Regulated Product-Liability
Litigation: Where We Are and Where We Might Be Headed, 32 HAMLINE L. REV. 657, 683
(2009).
49. Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and
Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3933–36 (Jan. 24, 2006) [hereinafter Requirements
on Content and Format]; see Beck, supra note 48, at 684.
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interfere with the FDA’s labeling determinations.50 The crux of the FDA’s
argument was based on concerns of “defensive labeling.”51 Under this
theory, the prospect of state litigation can add pressure on manufacturers to
warn consumers about risks that may be speculative, which in turn
discourages the safe and effective use of products and encourages secondguessing of FDA determinations in litigation.52
In May 2009, President Obama fought back against FDA preemption.53
In a memorandum directed to executive department and agency heads,
President Obama provided instructions for all agencies regarding
preemption determinations.54 President Obama’s memorandum directed
departments and agencies not to rely upon uncodified preemption preamble
provisions, to review whether preemption regulations are still justified
under traditional preemption principles every ten years, and to refrain from
codifying preemption provisions when not justified under traditional
preemption principles and Executive Order 13,132.55 In response to
President Obama’s memorandum, in October 2011, the FDA issued notice
that it had in fact reviewed its preemption preambles and codifications from
the past ten years and deemed that three of its preemption preambles were
not legally justified.56
As one commentator notes, the Obama Administration, despite its earlier
efforts to limit FDA preemption, actually supported the generic drug
manufacturer’s preemption claim in Bartlett.57 The government even
submitted an amicus brief to the Court indicating this view.58 Unlike other
cases,59 Bartlett “directly challenge[d] the FDA’s very authority to approve
a product in the first place” and initiated concerns over the future of
Because other support for preemption
biomedical innovation.60
50. Requirements on Content and Format, supra note 49, at 3967; see Beck, supra note
48, at 684–85.
51. Requirements on Content and Format, supra note 49, at 3935; see Beck, supra note
48, at 686.
52. Beck, supra note 48, at 685–86.
53. See Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Preemption of State Common Law by
Federal Agency Action: Striking the Appropriate Balance That Protects Public Safety, 84
TUL. L. REV. 1203, 1219 (2010).
54. Memorandum from the Administration of Barack Obama, Memorandum Regarding
Preemption (May 20, 2009), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/PresidentialMemorandum-Regarding-Preemption [http://perma.cc/HB7T-XTLW]; see Schwartz &
Silverman, supra note 53, at 1219–20.
55. Memorandum from the Administration of Barack Obama, supra note 54; see
Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 53, at 1220; see also Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed.
Reg. 43,255, 43,255 (Aug. 4, 1999) (ensuring “the principles of federalism established by
the Framers guide the executive departments and agencies in the formulation and
implementation of policies”).
56. Preemption Review, 76 Fed. Reg. 61,565, 61,565–66 (Oct. 5, 2011).
57. Tevi Troy, The Best Prescription for Pre-emption, WALL STREET. J.
(Mar. 18, 2013 7:11 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014241278873238696045783
68080602288500 [http://perma.cc/574M-7HSB].
58. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Mutual
Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013) (No. 12-142), 2013 WL 314460.
59. See infra Part I.D.1 (discussing Wyeth v. Levine and PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing).
60. See Troy, supra note 57.
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unsurprisingly came from pharmaceutical companies, this created a
situation of “strange bedfellows.”61
B. Federal Preemption
The doctrine of preemption is rooted in the U.S. Constitution’s
Supremacy Clause.62 Under this doctrine, courts are handed the task of
determining whether federal law has the effect of nullifying state law.63
The Court has applied preemption under three different theories: express,
field, and conflict preemption.64
1. Express Preemption
Express preemption analysis occurs when federal legislation explicitly
states federal law’s effect on state law65 or enumerates the state laws that
Congress does not want the statute to nullify.66 Ultimately, when engaging
in an express preemption analysis, a court must ascertain what the clause
itself means and determine from its meaning whether the clause nullifies
state law.67
2. Field Preemption
Another type of preemption is “field preemption.”68 A court will find
field preemption occurs when it concludes, “that Congress has intended

61. SCOTT GOTTLIEB, AM. ENTERPRISE INST., COURT CASE COULD UNDERMINE DRUG
APPROVAL PROCESS (2013), https://www.aei.org/publication/court-case-could-underminedrug-approval-process; see THOMAS MCGARITY, CENT. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, ANOTHER
SKIRMISH IN THE PREEMPTION WAR: DOES FDA APPROVAL TRUMP STRICT LIABILITY? (2013),
http://www.progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=5F199697-B315-8C86A26F5A4D15C6FCA3 (arguing the content of the amicus brief is inconsistent with
President Obama’s memorandum on preemption) [http://perma.cc/H9SH-X847]; Rich Samp,
DOJ/FDA
Brief
in
SCOTUS
Generic
Drug
Preemption
Case
Hands
Plaintiffs New Liability Theories, FORBES (Jan. 30, 2013, 12:21 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2013/01/30/dojfda-brief-in-scotus-generic-drug-preemption
-case-hands-plaintiffs-new-liability-theories/2/ (noting that in its amicus brief, the
government “went out of its way to propose a brand new cause of action that, in the federal
government’s view, would survive preemption”) [http://perma.cc/A8VP-PV8F].
62. See, e.g., Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2470 (2013)
(“Under the Supremacy Clause, state laws that require a private party to violate federal law
are pre-empted and, thus, are ‘without effect.’” (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S.
725, 746 (1981))); see also U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (“This Constitution and the Laws of the
United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.”).
63. See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 226 (2000).
64. See id.
65. See id.; see e.g., Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 77–84 (2008) (applying an
express preemption analysis).
66. See Nelson, supra note 63, at 226–27; see, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 30103(e) (2012)
(“Compliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety standard issued under this subchapter
does not exempt any person from any liability under common law.”).
67. See Nelson, supra note 63, at 227.
68. See id.
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federal law to be the exclusive law in a certain area of regulation.”69 Unlike
express preemption, field preemption allows a court to find that federal law
preempts state law without a direct conflict.70 Courts can infer this occurs
when the “‘federal regulatory scheme’ may be ‘so pervasive’” as to make
reasonable the inference that “Congress left no room for the States to
supplement it.”71 Additionally, courts infer preemption where “‘the federal
interest’ in the field that a federal statute addresses may be ‘so dominant’
that federal law ‘will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on
the same subject.’”72
3. Conflict Preemption
Federal law also may preempt state law under the doctrine of “conflict
preemption.”73 Conflict preemption is divided into two categories:
“obstacle” and “physical impossibility.”74
Under obstacle preemption, federal law preempts state law if the state
law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress.”75 Under “physical impossibility”
preemption, the theory of preemption that the Bartlett majority analyzed,76
a court will examine the feasibility of the actions required by state law with
respect to those actions required by federal law.77 Where federal law and
state law each impose different obligations via statute on the same subject
matter, a court determines whether it would be “literally impossible for
someone to comply with both statutes.”78 When two statutes impose
contradictory positive requirements, federal law preempts state law.79 For
example, if a federal law states that one must drive on the right side of the
road, and a state law states that one must drive on the left side of the road,
the federal law will be upheld.80 However, for federal law to preempt state
law, the physical impossibility doctrine requires that the state law require
an activity that federal law prohibits, or vice versa.81 For example, in
69. Christopher H. Schroeder, Supreme Court Preemption Doctrine, in PREEMPTION
CHOICE 125 (William W. Buzbee ed., 2009).
70. See id. at 126.
71. Nelson, supra note 63, at 227 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S.
218, 230 (1947)).
72. Id. at 227 (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230).
73. See id. at 227–28.
74. See Schroeder, supra note 69, at 131.
75. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); see Schroeder, supra note 69, at 132;
see, e.g., Geier v. Am. Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 881 (2000) (finding design defect claim
against car manufacturer for failure to equip car with airbag preempted under obstacle
preemption because it “would have stood as an obstacle to the gradual passive restraint
phase-in that the [Department of Transportation] regulation deliberately imposed”).
76. See infra note 183 and accompanying text.
77. See Schroeder, supra note 69, at 131.
78. Id.
79. See generally Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
80. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 45, Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, 133
S. Ct. 2466 (2013) (No. 12-142) (Alito, J.).
81. See Erika Fisher Lietzan & Sarah E. Pitlyk, Thoughts on Preemption in the Wake of
the Levine Decision, 13 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 225, 227 (2010).
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Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass’n v. Agricultural Marketing &
Bargaining Board,82 the Court held that federal law did not preempt state
law because the state law was “permissive” rather than “mandatory.”83
Physical impossibility preemption gets considerably murkier where
federal law has enacted a positive requirement that is seemingly contrary to
common law as opposed to a statute.84 Since Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
Inc.,85 the Court has engaged in a debate as to whether common law truly
creates a “requirement” imposed by state law.86 The question is whether
state common law creates a positive duty upon parties due to its regulatory
effect on human behavior, or whether it is not a “requirement,” but merely a
cost that the manufacturer must internalize.87
C. Determining Defect
As stated in section 402A, comment a of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts (“Restatement (Second)”), “[t]he rule [of design defect] is one of
strict liability, making the seller subject to liability to the user or consumer
even though he has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
the product.”88 As implemented in section 402A of the Restatement
(Second), following Judge Traynor’s opinions in the Supreme Court of
California cases Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno89 and
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,90 strict liability is concerned with the
status of the product itself—that is, whether the product sold is
“defective.”91
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) endorses the following test for
strict products liability:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability
for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to
his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and

82. 467 U.S. 461 (1984).
83. Id. at 478 n.21.
84. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional
Approach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449, 459–71 (2008) (discussing the Supreme Court’s “tort
as regulation” and “tort as compensation” jurisprudence).
85. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
86. See Sharkey, supra note 84, at 459–71.
87. See id.
88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
89. 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
90. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963). The opinions of Judge Richard Traynor are traditionally
viewed as establishing the doctrine of strict liability. See, e.g., Tellez v. Dole Food Co., Inc.,
No. BC 312 852, 2008 WL 744052, at *9 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 7, 2008) (“[T]he doctrine of
strict liability was created by Greenman . . . .”).
91. See DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 290 (2005). While section 402A
actually refers to this as “defective condition unreasonably dangerous,” courts have not
applied the term any differently when referred to as “defective,” “unreasonably dangerous,”
“defective condition unreasonably dangerous,” or similar terms. See id. at 263–64.
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(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.92

In order to be found liable, the manufacturer must produce a product that
is “defective” or “unreasonably dangerous.”93 This raises an important
question: When do we want “defect” or “unreasonable danger” to be
found?94 Courts and academics have formulated different answers to this
question.95
The following sections discuss the different tests that courts use to
determine defect. Part I.C.1 discusses the consumer expectations test. Part
I.C.2 discusses the traditional risk-utility test. Part I.C.3 discusses
variations of the risk-utility test. Part I.C.4 discusses variations that merge
the consumer expectations and risk-utility tests. Finally, Part I.C.5
discusses true absolute liability.
1. The Modern-Day Minority: Consumer Expectations Test
When courts were first handed the task of determining the meaning of
“defect” or “unreasonable danger” within section 402A of the Restatement
(Second), they initially looked to the Restatement’s comments for
guidance.96 The Restatement (Second) contained two relevant comments
which offered the courts guidance: comment g and comment i.97 Both of
these comments state that a determination of “defect” should ultimately be
based upon the expectations of consumers.98 As a result, in the 1960s and
1970s following the publication of the Restatement (Second), this was the
majority view of courts.99 A typical formulation of the test would ask a
jury whether “the manufacturer’s product failed to perform as safely as an
ordinary consumer would expect.”100
92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A.
93. See id.
94. See OWEN, supra note 91, at 290.
95. See infra Part I.C.1–2.
96. See OWEN, supra note 91, at 292.
97. See id. at 292–93.
98. See id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. g (AM. LAW INST.
1965) (“The rule stated in this Section applies only where the product is, at the time it leaves
the seller’s hands, in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be
unreasonable to him.”); id. cmt. i (“The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond
that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the
ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics.”).
99. See OWEN, supra note 91, at 293.
100. Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 303 (Cal. 1994); see also Mikolajczyk v.
Ford Motor Co., 901 N.E.2d 329, 352 (Ill. 2008) (“The jury is asked to make a single
determination: whether the product is unsafe when put to a use that is reasonably
foreseeable considering its nature and function . . . . No evidence of ordinary consumer
expectations is required, because the members of the jury may rely on their own experiences
to determine what an ordinary consumer would expect.” (citation omitted)).
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Although various commentators have pointed out the several flaws in the
consumer expectations test,101 some courts have continued to apply it and
reject any alternative.102
2. The Risk-Utility Test
Realizing the problems associated with application of the consumer
expectations test, courts presently tend to measure defectiveness of design
in the form of a risk-utility test.103 Furthermore, this is the approach
presently adopted by the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability
(“Restatement (Third)”).104
Generally, the risk-utility test involves “a balancing of the probability
and seriousness of harm against the costs of taking precautions.”105 Under
this rule, liability may not be found when the costs of avoiding a hazard are
deemed to be foreseeably greater than the resulting benefits.106 Conversely,
liability may be found where the benefits from preventing such a danger
exceed or outweigh any costs associated with it.107
Different jurisdictions may consider different factors when performing
this cost-benefit analysis.108 While some jurisdictions have taken a more
expansive approach,109 courts will generally refer to the factors
recommended by Dean John Wade.110 Under the “Wade Factors,” a court
will direct a jury to look to (1) the usefulness and desirability of the
product, (2) the product’s safety aspects, (3) the availability of a substitute

101. First, the consumer expectations test inhibits injured parties from recovering
damages for injuries caused by obvious dangers. See David G. Owen, Design Defect Ghosts,
74 BROOK. L. REV. 927, 942 (2009). Second, it prevents injured bystanders from recovering
damages. See Gomulka v. Yavapai Mach. & Auto Parts, Inc., 745 P.2d 986, 989 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1987) (“The consumer expectation test does not apply to bystanders, at least in design
defect cases, because a person who . . . is not using the product may be entirely ignorant of
its properties and of how safe it could be made.”). Third, it has been criticized as too vague
for juries to properly apply. See Horst v. Deere & Co., 2009 WI App 75, ¶ 95, 319 Wis. 2d
147, 769 N.W.2d 536, 558; James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Achieving
Consensus on Defective Product Design, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 867, 882 (1998) (calling the
consumer expectations test “so vague as to be lawless”).
102. See OWEN, supra note 91, at 296.
103. See id. at 301.
104. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST.
1998) (“[T]he test is whether a reasonable alternative design would, at reasonable cost, have
reduced the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product and, if so, whether the omission
of the alternative design by the seller or a predecessor in the distributive chain rendered the
product not reasonably safe.”).
105. OWEN, supra note 91, at 303 (quoting Raney v. Honeywell, Inc., 540 F.2d 932, 935
(8th Cir. 1976)).
106. See id. at 303–04.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 499–504.
109. See id. at 499; see, e.g., Banks v. ICI Ams., Inc., 450 S.E.2d 671, 675 (Ga. 1994)
(“[N]o finite set of factors can be considered comprehensive or applicable under every
factual circumstance, since such matters must necessarily vary according to the unique facts
of each case.”).
110. See OWEN, supra note 91, at 500–01; see also John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict
Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISS. L.J. 825, 837–38 (1973) (proposing the Wade Factors).

338

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

product that would serve the same function in a safer manner, (4) the
manufacturer’s ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product
without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its
utility, (5) the user’s ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the
use of the product, (6) the user’s ability to anticipate awareness of the
dangers inherent in the product and their avoidability, and (7) the feasibility
on the part of the manufacturer of spreading the loss.111
3. Modifications and Reformulations of the Risk-Utility Test
While the risk-utility test is the most commonly used test to determine
defect, different jurisdictions employ different variations of it. This section
explores these variations. Part I.C.1.a discusses the alternative design
requirement. Part I.C.2.b discusses the prudent manufacturer test. Finally,
Part I.C.3.c discusses the Restatement (Third)’s variation.
a. Alternative Design
One of the Wade Factors requires a jury to consider and evaluate the
feasibility and reasonableness of an alternative design.112 The Restatement
(Third) suggests that this should be a requirement, not merely one factor for
a jury to consider.113 Similarly, many jurisdictions require proof of a
feasible alternative design to prove defectiveness under the risk-utility
test.114 Normally, the injured plaintiff will hold the burden of proof on the
issue of alternative design.115 Other states, however, while not requiring
the proof of an alternative design, will allow it to be considered in the
process.116 Finally, some states have completely rejected a jury’s
consideration of an alternative design due to the high cost plaintiffs endure
to prove it and the alternative design requirement’s perceived low value.117
111. See Akee v. Dow Chem. Co., 272 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1132 (D. Haw. 2003); Wade,
supra note 110, at 837–38.
112. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
113. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b) (AM. LAW INST.
1998). James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski argue that this is the “consensus view”
and that the minority jurisdictions may accept it “given time for reflection.” Henderson &
Twerski, supra note 101, at 920.
114. See OWEN, supra note 91, at 506; see, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Edwards, 482
So.2d 1176, 1191 (Ala. 1985), overruled on other grounds by Schwartz v. Volvo N. Am.
Corp., 554 So.2d 927 (Ala. 1989).
115. See OWEN, supra note 91, at 506–07.
116. See id. at 507.
117. See id.; see also Vautour v. Body Masters Sports Indus., 784 A.2d 1178, 1183 (N.H.
2001). One commentator argues that it ignores the complexity of modern day products,
increases the expense of lawsuits, assumes that consumers are insured, is contrary to strict
liability’s purpose in making lawsuits and recovery by plaintiffs easier, will prevent certain
lawsuits from being brought that will increase hazards of dangerous products, and fails to
bear the inherent costs on the manufacturer. See Frank J. Vandall, The Restatement (Third)
of Torts: Products Liability Section 2(b): The Reasonable Alternative Design Requirement,
61 TENN. L. REV. 1407, 1423–24 (1994). Another commentator sees the Restatement
(Third)’s inclusion of this requirement as a result of special interest advocates manipulating
caselaw. See Patrick Lavelle, Crashing into Proof of a Reasonable Alternative Design: The
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b. The Prudent Manufacturer Test
The prudent manufacturer test, also commonly referred to as the
“hindsight test” or the “Wade-Keeton test,” is applied in some
jurisdictions.118 Under this test, a jury is instructed to impute knowledge
regarding
the
products’
condition
to
the
manufacturer.119
As stated in Dorsey v. Yoder Co.,120 under the prudent manufacturer test,
“the proper test of ‘unreasonable danger’ is whether a reasonable
manufacturer would continue to market his product in the same condition as
he sold it to the plaintiff with knowledge of the potential dangerous
consequences the trial just revealed.”121 This test allows jurors to account
for information about a product’s risk that may have been revealed after the
time of the design, or even after the accident itself.122 Despite the
disassociation or repudiation of the test by both of its original proponents,
Dean John Wade and W. Page Keeton,123 some jurisdictions continue to
adhere to the hindsight test.124
The prudent manufacturer test is not a unique test in and of itself, like the
consumer expectations test, but rather a version of the risk-utility test where
knowledge developed from the record is imputed upon the manufacturer.125
Jurisdictions that do support the viability of the prudent manufacturer test
apply it along with the risk-utility test, as it is a version of the risk-utility
test.126
For example, in Golonka v. General Motors Corp.,127 in a design defect
action against an automobile manufacturer, the Court of Appeals of Arizona
analyzed how a jury should determine defectiveness under this test.128 The
Fallacy of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 38 DUQ. L. REV. 1059, 1101
(2000).
118. See OWEN, supra note 91, at 532; see also Ray ex rel. Holman v. BIC Corp., 925
S.W.2d 527, 533 (Tenn. 1996) (“Wade-Keeton” test); Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., 709 P.2d 876,
881 (Ariz. 1985) (“hindsight test” and “prudent manufacturer test”).
119. See OWEN, supra note 91, at 531.
120. 331 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
121. Id. at 759–60.
122. See JOHN C. P. GOLDBERG ET AL., TORT LAW: RESPONSIBILITY AND REDRESS 959 (3d.
ed. 2012).
123. See OWEN, supra note 91, at 533. They had both argued for the application of this
test independently in a series of articles. See id. at 530–31.
124. See id. at 533–54 (citing a state statute in Tennessee, and courts in Arizona, New
York, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Montana, and Mississippi, that continue to adhere to the
hindsight test).
125. See Privette v. CSX Transp. Inc., No. 02-5312, 2003 WL 22514347, at *9 (6th Cir.
Nov. 4, 2003) (“To prevail under the prudent manufacturer test, a plaintiff must establish
that [sic] ‘that the product because of its dangerous condition would not be put on the market
by a reasonably prudent manufacturer or seller, assuming that the manufacturer or seller
knew of its dangerous condition.’ . . . This determination involves a risk-utility
analysis . . . .”); Dominick Vetri, Order Out of Chaos: Products Liability Design-Defect
Law, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 1373, 1395 (2009) (“The [prudent manufacturer test] . . . generally
relies on risk-utility evidence and analysis, but frames the jury question in terms of what a
reasonable manufacturer would have done in the circumstances.”).
126. See Vetri, supra note 125, at 1395–98.
127. 65 P.3d 956 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003).
128. See id. at 963.
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court found that the information that the trial revealed should be imputed to
the manufacturer, and then the risk-utility factors should be applied in
“hindsight” to decide whether it was reasonable for the manufacturer to put
the product on the market.129 Thus, the court demonstrated how the aspect
of hindsight can be applied alongside the risk-utility test.
c. The Restatement (Third)’s Reformulation
The Restatement (Third) contains arguably one of the more defendantfriendly formulations of the test for design.130 Section 6(c) of the
Restatement (Third) states:
A prescription drug . . . is not reasonably safe due to defective design if
the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the drug or medical device are
sufficiently great in relation to its foreseeable therapeutic benefits that
reasonable health-care providers, knowing of such foreseeable risks and
therapeutic benefits, would not prescribe the drug . . . for any class of
patients.131

While this standard has been highly criticized,132 recently some courts
have been willing to accept the Restatement (Third)’s design defect
analysis.133 For example, in Haffner v. Stryker Corp.,134 the Colorado
District Court determined whether a plaintiff stated a plausible claim
regarding his design defect suit against the manufacturer of a knee
replacement system.135 The plaintiff claimed that the knee replacement
system was defectively designed because it contained substances, nickel
and cobalt, to which 19 percent of the population is allergic or sensitive,
despite there being hypoallergenic alternatives available.136 The court
129. See id.; see also Sternhagen v. Dow Co., 935 P.2d 1139, 1147 (Mont. 1997) (“[W]e
conclude that, in a strict products liability case, knowledge of any undiscovered or
undiscoverable dangers should be imputed to the manufacturer.”).
130. See generally James A. Henderson, Jr., Prescription Drug Design Liability Under
the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts: A Reporter’s Perspective, 48 RUTGERS L. REV.
471 (1996).
131. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(C) (AM. LAW INST. 1998).
132. See Freeman v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 618 N.W.2d 827, 838–40 (Neb. 2000)
(arguing that the test misstates the law, is difficult to apply, is inflexible, and cannot be
defeated easily by an expert witness); George W. Conk, Is There a Design Defect in the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability?, 109 YALE L.J. 1087, 1133 (2000) (“The
process of selecting a design should be informed by the knowledge that the designer
someday may have to justify the particular balance it chose between risk and utility. Such
thoughtful consideration of the need to justify design choices ultimately will result in better,
safer products.”); Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Rethinking Conscious Design Liability for
Prescription Drugs: The Restatement (Third) Standard Versus a Negligence Approach, 63
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 76, 76 (1994) (“[A] near-immunity standard provides too much
protection for manufacturers and too little protection for consumers.”).
133. See ANDREW SOLOW ET AL., KAYE SCHOLER LLP, THE EVER-SHIFTING LANDSCAPE IN
PRESCRIPTION DRUG DESIGN DEFECT LITIGATION 7 (2014), http://www.kayescholer.com/inthe-market/publications/articles/20140204-shifting-landscape-in-prescription-drug-designdefect-litigation-product-liability/_res/id=sa_File1/solow-anziska-meyers-product-liabilityarticle.pdf [http://perma.cc/WB4G-KMT8].
134. No. 14-CV-00186-RBJ, 2014 WL 4821107 (D. Colo. Sept. 29, 2014).
135. See id. at *1.
136. See id. at *3.
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dismissed these claims, citing the Restatement (Third), and held that
“medical devices can be safe for certain patient populations and not others
without their risk outweighing their utility.”137
4. Consumer Expectations and Risk-Utility Come Together
While certain jurisdictions consider the consumer expectations and riskutility tests to be mutually exclusive, several jurisdictions have abandoned
that approach and accommodate each test in different circumstances.138
First, some jurisdictions allow either of these tests to be proven to hold a
manufacturer liable for design defect.139 Under the jurisdictions that apply
the “two-pronged approach,” a plaintiff may establish design defect through
either the consumer expectations test or the risk-utility test.140 For
example, in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.,141 the Supreme Court of
California held that a product may be deemed defective
(1) if the plaintiff demonstrates that the product failed to perform as safely
as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or
reasonably foreseeable manner, or (2) if the plaintiff proves
that the product’s design proximately caused his injury and the defendant
fails to prove, in light of the relevant factors . . . that on balance the
benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in
such design.142

Second, some jurisdictions will apply the tests in different situations.143
For example, in Halliday v. Sturm, Ruger & Co.,144 the Maryland Court of
Appeals held that the consumer expectations test applies to design defect
cases unless the product malfunctions, in which case the risk-utility test
applies.145
Third, some jurisdictions may use one test as part of the other test,
effectively combining the two tests into one.146 For example, in Potter v.
Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co.,147 the Supreme Court of Connecticut held
that one of the factors that may be considered within the consumer
expectations test applied by the state may be the risk-utility factors.148

137. Id.
138. See David G. Owen, Design Defects, 73 MO. L. REV. 291, 336–64 (2008).
139. See id. at 341.
140. See id. at 341–42.
141. 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978).
142. Id. at 457–58 (emphasis added).
143. See Owen, supra note 138, at 346–53.
144. 792 A.2d 1145, 1153 (Md. 2002).
145. See id.
146. See Owen, supra note 138, at 335–41.
147. 694 A.2d 1319, 1333 (Conn. 1997).
148. See id. (“[A] consumer’s expectations may be viewed in light of various factors that
balance the utility of the product’s design with the magnitude of its risks.”); see also Delaney
v. Deere & Co., 999 P.2d 930, 944 (Kan. 2000) (“[W]e . . . recognize the validity of
risk/utility analysis as a guide in determining the expectations of consumers in complex
cases.”).
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5. No Test for Defect: True Absolute Liability
In a true absolute liability regime,149 in order to make a prima facie
claim, a court does not need to find that the defendant was at “fault.”150
Rather, a plaintiff’s injury must merely be causally related to the product,
regardless of whether the defendant took the utmost care and whether there
was a defect in the product.151
True “absolute liability” and “strict liability” in tort are distinct concepts
despite some commentators’ and courts’ willingness to use these terms
interchangeably.152 True absolute liability means that there is no excuse
that will prevent liability so long as it was actually the defendant that
caused the injury.153 Meanwhile, strict liability does not create as broad an
assumption of liability.154 Rather, in strict liability, the defendant is only
liable if a jury finds that the product that caused the injury was defective.155
Unlike true absolute liability, strict liability requires a court to determine
that a product was defective before liability can be found.156
The Supreme Court of Oregon identified this distinction in Phillips v.
Kimwood Machine Co.157 When the Phillips court determined the correct
standard for determining defect, it noted that “[t]he problem with strict
liability of products has been one of limitation. No one wants absolute
liability where all the article has to do is to cause injury.”158 The court then
explained how this limitation, in products liability law, is found: “To
impose liability [in true absolute liability] there has to be something about
the article which makes it dangerously defective without regard to whether
the manufacturer was or was not at fault for such condition. A test for
unreasonable danger is therefore vital.”159
Presently, however, there are no jurisdictions that impose a true absolute
liability design defect on drug manufacturers; in other words, no
jurisdictions impose liability upon the manufacturer regardless of whether

149. This Note uses the terminology “true absolute liability” due to the tendency of courts
and commentators to interchangeably use the terms “strict liability” and “absolute liability”
despite their different meanings. See OWEN, supra note 91, at 290; Robert C. Baker III,
Requiem for a Remedy: The Law and Economics of Mutual Pharmaceutical v. Bartlett’s
Over-Preemption, 74 MD. L. REV. ENDNOTES 81, 97–98 (2015). When used by a court in
this Note however, the term remains unaltered.
150. See OWEN, supra note 91, at 290.
151. See id.
152. See id.; supra note 149.
153. See OWEN, supra note 91, at 290.
154. See id.
155. See id. at 260–61.
156. See id. at 290; Gerald F. Tietz, Strict Products Liability, Design Defects and
Corporate Decision-Making: Greater Deterrence Through Stricter Process, 38 VILL. L.
REV. 1361, 1430–31 n.339 (1993) (“Although liability may be imposed without fault—e.g.,
when a manufacturer knowingly places a dangerous product into the stream of commerce—
the liability is not absolute because it is created only when the product is found to be more
dangerous than is reasonable under the circumstances . . . .”).
157. 525 P.2d 1033 (Or. 1974).
158. Id. at 1036.
159. Id.
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the product is defective.160 Rather, all jurisdictions presently impose some
sort of fault determination, i.e., strict liability, by finding liability when the
product is in fact defective.161
D. Wyeth, Mensing & Bartlett
This section discusses the three major U.S. Supreme Court cases that led
to the lower court split following Bartlett. Part I.D.1 discusses the two
Supreme Court cases that set the stage for Bartlett. Then, Part I.D.2
discusses Bartlett itself.
1. Wyeth v. Levine and PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing: Setting the Stage
for Generic Drug Manufacturer Design Defect Preemption
In Wyeth v. Levine,162 the Court addressed whether FDA regulations
preempted a plaintiff’s failure-to-warn lawsuit under state law against a
brand name drug manufacturer.163 As to impossibility preemption, the
Court held that it was possible for a brand name drug manufacturer to
comply with both state duties under failure-to-warn common law and
federal statutory law.164 In Wyeth, the Court determined that federal law
allowed brand name drug companies to unilaterally strengthen its drug
warnings and therefore, federal law does not prohibit a brand name drug
company from changing its label to properly warn of dangers associated
with a drug.165 Therefore, Wyeth held that because federal law allows the
brand name drug company to change its labeling, there is no conflict
between state and federal law.166
Two years later in PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing,167 the Court addressed
whether FDA regulations preempted a similar failure-to-warn suit against a
generic drug manufacturer.168 In Mensing, the Court identified the state
and federal duties.169 First, they found that the applicable state law
“require[s] a drug manufacturer that is or should be aware of its product’s
danger to label that product in a way that renders it reasonably safe.”170
Second, under federal law, the Court determined that FDA regulations
allow generic drugs to receive approval “simply by showing equivalence to
a reference listed drug that has already been approved by the FDA.”171
160. See JAMES L. GILBERT ET AL., LITIGATING TORT CASES § 59:60 (2014) (“[I]n no state
is strict liability tantamount to absolute liability for injuries caused by a product.”); Tietz,
supra note 156, at 1430–31 n.339 (1993) (“[T]his author is aware of no decision that actually
imposes an absolute liability standard.”); Baker, supra note 149, at 97.
161. See supra note 160.
162. 555 U.S. 555 (2009).
163. See id. at 558.
164. See id. at 572–73.
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011).
168. See id. at 2572.
169. See id. at 2573.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 2574 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A) (2006)).
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However, FDA regulations prevented these drugs from “independently
changing their generic drugs’ safety labels.”172
The Court held that federal law preempted these failure-to-warn claims
against generic drug manufacturers under the doctrine of impossibility
preemption.173 The Court explained that if the generic drug manufacturer
had independently changed its label to satisfy the state duty, then it would
have violated FDA regulations which require “sameness” between a generic
drug and its corresponding brand name drug’s labeling.174 Therefore, after
Wyeth and Mensing, an injured consumer’s ability to sue a drug
manufacturer on a failure-to-warn theory is severely restricted.
2. Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett
Two years after Mensing, the Court decided Bartlett. In 1978, the FDA
approved the nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drug “sulindac” under the
brand name “clinoril.”175
After its patent expired, several drug
manufacturers—including Mutual Pharmaceutical Company (Mutual)—
produced generic versions of clinoril.176 Karen Bartlett was prescribed
clinoril, but was ultimately given the generic version manufactured by
Mutual and suffered from toxic epidermal necrolysis.177 Toxic epidermal
necrolysis is a syndrome characterized by skin peeling off in a manner
similar to that of second-degree burns.178
Bartlett originally asserted failure-to-warn and design defect claims, but
the New Hampshire District Court dismissed the failure-to-warn claim
because Bartlett’s doctor admitted that he did not read the relevant
warnings.179 However, her design defect claim was successful and resulted
in a twenty-one million dollar verdict in her favor.180 Mutual appealed,
arguing that FDCA and FDA regulations preempted the design defect
claim, but the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision.181 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari and heard the appeal.182
At issue in Bartlett was whether FDA regulations preempted Bartlett’s
design defect claim against Mutual under the doctrine of impossibility
preemption because it would be impossible for Mutual to comply with both
federal and state requirements.183 First, the Court determined the generic
drug manufacturers’ duties under state law.184 The Court recognized that
172. Id. at 2577.
173. See id. at 2577–78.
174. See id.
175. Mutual Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2471 (2013).
176. See id.
177. See id. at 2472.
178. Toxic epidermal necrolysis, STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY (27th ed. 2000).
179. See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct at 2472.
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 694 (2012); see Bartlett, 133 S. Ct.
at 2472.
183. See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2470.
184. See id. at 2473.
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New Hampshire adhered to design defect law as recommended by section
402A of the Restatement (Second).185 Therefore,
[u]nder the Restatement—and consequently, under New Hampshire tort
law—“[o]ne who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability
for physical harm thereby caused” even though he “has exercised all
possible care in the preparation and sale of the product.”186

The Court then addressed Mutual’s arguments that there is no state
duty.187 First, the Court rejected the respondent’s argument that because
New Hampshire tort law is compensatory, and not regulatory, it did not
create a duty.188
Second, the Court rejected respondent’s argument that New Hampshire
law does not impose “strict liability,” but rather “absolute liability,” and
thus, there are no state “requirements” because absolute liability does not
impose a duty.189 The Court rejected this argument because the argument
failed to recognize the distinctions between jurisdictions that impose “strict
liability” and “absolute liability.”190 As stated by the Court in Bartlett, in
strict liability, “liability does not depend on negligence, but still signals the
breach of a duty,” while in absolute liability, “liability does not reflect the
breach of any duties at all, but merely serves to spread risk.”191
The Court then proved that New Hampshire had not adopted an absolute
liability regime, but rather a strict liability regime.192 In support of this
claim, the Court cited a series of New Hampshire Court of Appeals cases
noting that 402(A) strict liability ultimately imposes a duty on the
manufacturer that requires that they produce a safe product.193
Because the Court did not need to address whether an “absolute liability”
regime could be preempted by the relevant FDA regulations, the Court, in a
footnote, added: “[w]e can thus save for another day the question whether a
true absolute-liability state-law system could give rise to impossibility preemption. As we have noted, most common-law causes of action for
negligence and strict liability do not exist merely to spread risk, but rather
impose affirmative duties.”194
The Court then determined the content of the duty New Hampshire law
imposed.195 The Court noted that under New Hampshire’s strict liability
185. See id. (citing Buttrick v. Arthur Lessard & Sons, Inc., 260 A.2d 111, 112–13
(1969)).
186. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. LAW INST. 1965))
(second alteration in original).
187. Id.
188. See id.
189. See id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. See id. at 2473–74.
193. See id. (citations omitted).
194. Id. at 2474 n.1 (citing Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 323–24 (2008);
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504, 522 (1992)).
195. See id. at 2474.
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law, courts apply the risk-utility test to determine whether the product is
defective.196 Under New Hampshire law, the risk-utility test requires a
balancing of various factors, the most important being the product’s
usefulness and desirability, feasibility of the reduction of danger without
significant affect on the product’s effectiveness or manufacturing cost, and
the presence and efficacy of a warning.197
The Court then analyzed the duty that federal law imposed.198 The Court
held that federal law prevented generic drug manufacturers from
unilaterally changing their labels because FDCA rules required generic
drugs to “have the same active ingredients, route of administration, dosage
form, strength, and labeling as the brand-name drug on which it is
Second, the nature of sundilac’s chemical composition
based.”199
precluded redesign because it was a one molecule drug.200
The Court then evaluated the state and federal duties and found that they
conflicted.201 The only way for Mutual to change its “risk utility profile”
under state law and escape liability was to strengthen its warning label.202
Because state law required Mutual to strengthen sundilac’s warnings, and
federal law prohibited Mutual from strengthening sundilac’s warnings, they
conflicted.203
The Court then addressed the so-called “stop selling alternative.”204
Under this theory, it is not impossible to comply with both federal and state
requirements if the generic drug manufacturer simply refrains from selling
the generic drug.205 The Court rejected this argument because preemption
does not require that a party, in order to satisfy both federal and state
requirements, refrain from engaging in behavior altogether to avoid
liability.206 Rather, the Court held that such a holding would effectively
eviscerate the entire doctrine of preemption.207 The Court noted that in
196. See id. (quoting Vautour v. Body Masters Sports Indus., 784 A.2d 1178, 1181 (N.H.
2001); Chellman v. Saab-Scania AB, 138 A.2d 148, 150 (N.H. 1993)).
197. Id. at 2475 (quoting Vautour, 784 A.2d at 1182).
198. See id. at 2476.
199. See id. at 2475 (citing 21 U.S.C §§ 355(j)(2)(A)(ii)–(v), (8)(B) (2012); 21 C.F.R.
§ 320.1(c) (2009)). The federal law that Bartlett analyzed was the Hatch-Waxman Act,
which amended the FDCA and FDA regulations related to the Hatch-Waxman amendment.
See id. at 2471; Colleen Kelly, The Balance Between Innovation and Competition: The
Hatch-Waxman Act, the 2003 Amendments, and Beyond, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 417, 417–19
(2011). The Hatch-Waxman Act sought to offer generic drugs an expedited approval
process in order to allow pharmaceuticals to be more readily available to consumers. See id.
at 417–18. Rather than undergoing a lengthy and expensive process to prove that a drug is
safe and effective, generic drug manufacturers must merely submit an application
demonstrating that a generic drug is equivalent to an FDA-approved brand name drug. See
id. at 423. The FDA has approved over 10,000 generic drugs through this process. See id. at
418.
200. See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2475.
201. See id. at 2476–77.
202. See id. at 2475.
203. See id. at 2476–77.
204. See id. at 2477.
205. See id.
206. See id.
207. Id.
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every instance where impossibility preemption had been found, there would
not have been a conflict between state and federal law if the actor refrained
from engaging in the activity completely.208
II. THE LOWER COURTS DIVIDE
Lower courts have offered divergent theories regarding how Bartlett
should be applied. Some jurisdictions see Bartlett’s holding as narrow and
find room for design defects to maintain viability,209 while others view
Bartlett’s holding as broad and suggest that no design defect claim has
continued viability after Bartlett.210 Part II.A discusses cases that held (or
suggested) that design defect claims against generic drug manufacturers can
escape preemption even after Bartlett. Part II.B discusses cases holding
that design defect claims against generic drug manufacturers cannot escape
preemption after Bartlett.
A. Courts Finding that Standard of Defectiveness
Affects the Preemption Analysis
While in the minority, some lower courts have found that the state’s test
for defect does play a role in the preemption analysis after Bartlett.211 The
Eighth Circuit suggested it could212 (although it recently backtracked
partially),213 the Eastern District of Missouri held that design defect claims
against generic drug manufacturers are not preempted when the consumer
expectations test is used,214 the Illinois Appellate Court held design defect
claims against generic drug manufacturers are not preempted when there is
no alternative design that can be made,215 and the Pennsylvania Superior
Court has suggested that the “absolute liability” exception theorized in a
Bartlett footnote has present applicability.216
1. Fullington v. Pfizer, Inc. (Fullington I)
In Fullington v. Pfizer, Inc.217 (Fullington I), the Eighth Circuit
addressed whether federal law preempted a design defect claim against a
generic drug manufacturer under Arkansas law.218 In Fullington I, the
appellant alleged that she developed tardive dyskinesia after ingesting MCP

208. See id. But see id. at 2477 n.3 (noting an exception in “the rare case in which state or
federal law actually requires a product to be pulled from the market—our pre-emption cases
presume that a manufacturer’s ability to stop selling does not turn impossibility into
possibility.” (citing Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 143 (1963))).
209. See infra Part II.A.
210. See infra Part II.B.
211. See infra Part II.A.1–4.
212. See infra Part II.A.1.
213. See infra Part II.B.2.c; infra note 285.
214. See infra Part II.A.2.
215. See infra Part II.A.4.
216. See infra Part II.A.3.
217. 720 F.3d 739 (8th Cir. 2013).
218. See id. at 745–47.
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produced by a generic drug manufacturer from April 2008 to April 2009.219
The Arkansas District Court originally granted the generic drug
manufacturer’s motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s design
defect claim against the generic drug manufacturer.220
In Fullington I, the Eighth Circuit distinguished the appellant’s design
defect claim from that in Bartlett.221 The court noted that rather than using
the risk-utility test, Arkansas applies the consumer expectations test to
determine defect.222 The court held that because of this difference, “it is
not immediately clear whether Arkansas, unlike New Hampshire, offers
generic drug manufacturers an opportunity, consistent with federal
obligations, to somehow alter an otherwise unreasonably dangerous
drug.”223 Rather than answering this question of law, the court reversed the
district court’s dismissal of the design defect claim and remanded the case
back to the district court.224
2. Neeley v. Wolters Kluwer Health, Inc.
In Neeley v. Wolters Kluwer Health, Inc.,225 the Eastern District of
Missouri determined whether federal law preempted a design defect claim
against a generic drug manufacturer under Kentucky law.226 In Neeley, the
court noted that Kentucky law, just like the Arkansas law discussed in
Fullington I, required a court to apply to the consumer expectations test to
determine defect.227 Relying on Fullington I, the Neeley court stated that
“it is not immediately clear whether [Kentucky] . . . offers generic drug
manufacturers an opportunity, consistent with federal obligations, to
somehow alter an otherwise unreasonably dangerous drug.”228 However,
without even discussing how the consumer expectations test might affect
the preemption analysis, the court denied the generic manufacturer’s motion
to dismiss.229
3. Hassett v. Dafoe
In Hassett v. Dafoe,230 the Pennsylvania Superior Court determined
whether federal law preempts a design defect claim against a generic drug

219. See id. at 741.
220. See id. at 742.
221. See id. at 746.
222. See id.
223. Id.
224. See id. at 747. However, the district court did ultimately find that the claims were
preempted. See infra Part II.B.1.c (discussing the case on remand).
225. No. 4:11–CV–325 JAR, 2013 WL 3929059 (E.D. Mo. July 29, 2013).
226. See id. at *10. For the facts of Neeley, see supra notes 1–11 and accompanying text.
227. See Neeley, 2013 WL 3929059, at *10.
228. Id. (quoting Fullington, 720 F.3d at 746) (alteration in original).
229. See id.
230. 74 A.3d 202 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013).
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manufacturer under Pennsylvania law.231 In Hassett, the respondent
alleged that he suffered tardive dyskinesia due to ingesting MCP.232
In Hassett, the court analyzed the holding in Bartlett.233 The court stated
that “[t]he Bartlett court concluded that New Hampshire’s version of
§ 402A liability did not impose absolute liability on manufacturers, but
instead, a ‘duty to design [their products] reasonably safely for the uses
which [they] can foresee.’”234 However, the Hassett court further noted
that “the Court expressly reserved ‘for another day the question whether a
true absolute-liability state-law system could give rise to absolute-liability
pre-emption.’”235
The court then criticized the “tsunami of cases” that the defendants had
provided, arguing that these cases had failed to properly identify the “state
law duties associated with various causes of action and a cogent analysis of
how they conflict with federal law, which is the hallmark of an
impossibility pre-emption determination.”236 The court then further
criticized the defendants, noting that they had not properly appreciated the
nuance that preemption under Bartlett was “state-law specific.”237 The
court noted that because the case before the court “involv[ed] more than
two thousand plaintiffs, many different states’ laws are potentially
implicated.”238
The court then analyzed the claims that the plaintiffs asserted in their
complaint.239 The court stated that the plaintiffs asserted that the drug “has
never been shown to be either efficacious or safe when used for long-term
treatment,” “continued to [be] market[ed] . . . despite the fact that there
were safer and less expensive alternatives available,” and “even when used
as recommended and with appropriate warnings, was defective and
unreasonably dangerous.”240
The Hassett court characterized the plaintiff’s claims as asserting
absolute liability.241 The court noted that regimes that impose absolute
liability do not require a court to find that a duty was breached.242 The
court then noted that because there is no state duty for the federal duty to
conflict with under an absolute liability regime, the “[d]efendants can
comply with federal law, which does not permit them to unilaterally alter a
drug’s design, and state law, which extends liability to a manufacturer of a

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
1965)).

See id. at 210–11.
See id. at 206.
See id. at 211.
Id. (quoting Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2013)).
Id. (quoting Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2474 n.1).
Id. at 211–12.
Id. at 212.
Id. at 212 n.6.
See id. at 212.
Id.
See id.
See id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. f (AM. LAW INST.
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defectively designed drug without regard to whether it may redesign its
drug.”243
Judge William H. Platt filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting
in part.244 In his dissent, Judge Platt argued that the majority failed to
understand the differences between strict liability and absolute liability.245
Furthermore, the dissent implied that the majority was hypocritical because,
while they criticized the appellant for the failure to engage in a proper
preemption analysis, the majority offered no case law or statutory law
whatsoever that supported the assertion that the plaintiff’s design defect
claim survived preemption.246
Judge Platt then suggested that the majority engaged in judicial activism
by trying to find absolute liability where there was none.247 Judge Platt
argued that these claims were preempted despite the majority’s “eclectic
exegesis” because Congress had regulated generic drugs in this manner.248
The dissent then identified the majority’s failure to regard any precedent,
even for persuasive value, that would have altered the outcome of the
case.249 The dissent continued by quoting Bartlett: “The dreadful injuries
from which products liabilities cases arise often engender passionate
responses. Today is no exception[.] But sympathy for [the injured party]
does not relieve us of the responsibility of following the law.”250
4. Guvenoz v. Target Corp.
In Guvenoz v. Target Corp.,251 the Illinois Appellate Court determined
whether federal law preempted a plaintiff’s design defect suit against a
generic drug manufacturer under Illinois law.252 In Guvenoz, the plaintiff
alleged that the generic drug propoxyphene caused his cardiac arrest.253
After summarizing the Supreme Court’s holdings in Mensing and Bartlett,
the court stated that the facts of the case at bar were distinguishable because
in those cases “the drug was safe for the vast majority of patients taking it,
and only a ‘very small number of patients’ suffered an adverse and severe
reaction,” while in the case at bar the “plaintiff alleges that there was no
group of patients for whom the drug’s benefits outweighed its risks.”254
In Guvenoz, the drug at issue had been approved by the FDA, was
ingested by the plaintiff while it was approved, and the plaintiff’s injuries

243. Id.
244. Id. at 217 (Platt, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
245. See id. at 220 (citing Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2474
n.1 (2013)).
246. See id. at 220–21.
247. See id.
248. Id. at 220.
249. See id. at 221.
250. Id. at 221 (quoting Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2478) (first alteration in original).
251. 2015 IL App. (1st) 133940.
252. See id. ¶ 44.
253. See id. ¶ 10.
254. Id. ¶ 72 (quoting Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2471).
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occurred while it was approved.255 However, afterwards, the FDA required
manufacturers to withdraw any products containing propoxyphene due to
safety studies showing the drug’s adverse impact on electrical activity in the
heart.256 The court held that because the plaintiff alleged that the “drug was
simply unsafe and should not have been sold at all” and that “since no
remedy was possible,” there is no “safe harbor” under Bartlett.257 Because
the plaintiff claimed that there was no improvement that could be made to
the design or label that would have resolved the issue, there could not be a
conflict with the generic drug manufacturer’s requirement to have the same
design and label as the brand name manufacturer.258 The court noted that
while Illinois courts use both the consumer expectations test and the riskutility test, the result would be the same, as “[f]ederal law does not provide
the drug companies with a ‘safe harbor’ to avoid liability for dangerous
drugs, and there was no direct and positive conflict with their federal duty
of sameness, when the drug should not have been sold.”259
B. Courts Finding That Standard of Defectiveness
Does Not Affect the Preemption Analysis
The more common trend is for courts to find that Bartlett stands for an
across-the-board preemption of state design defect causes of action. Part
II.B.1 discusses cases holding that federal law preempts design defect
claims against generic drug manufacturers in jurisdictions applying the
consumer expectations test. Part II.B.2 discusses cases holding that federal
law preempts design defect claims against generic drug manufacturers in
jurisdictions applying the risk-utility test.
1. Consumer Expectations Jurisdictions
Various courts after Bartlett have held that design defect claims are
preempted under the consumer expectations test. The following cases offer
a detailed explanation regarding this holding.260
a. Drager v. PLIVA USA, Inc.
In Drager v. PLIVA USA, Inc.,261 the Fourth Circuit determined whether
federal law preempted a plaintiff’s design defect suit against a generic drug
manufacturer under Maryland law.262 In Drager, following the ten month
255. See id. ¶¶ 14–18.
256. See id. ¶ 19.
257. Id. ¶ 73 (quoting Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2479).
258. See id.
259. Id. ¶ 97 (quoting Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2479).
260. The cases expanded upon below are not an exhaustive list of all courts that have held
that Bartlett preempts consumer expectations design defect suits. This section limits its
discussion to those cases that have addressed any argument that Bartlett does not apply to
jurisdictions that do not apply the risk-utility test in the same manner that New Hampshire
did in Bartlett.
261. 741 F.3d 470 (4th Cir. 2014).
262. See id. at 475.
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use of the generic drug MCP, the appellant developed tardive dyskinesia
and akathisia.263
The appellant argued that this case was distinguishable from Bartlett
because Maryland law applies the consumer expectations test to determine
“defect.”264 The Drager court rejected this argument and held that the
difference between the two tests with respect to the impossibility
preemption analysis is “immaterial.”265
The court then elaborated by stating that ultimately, the Bartlett Court
did not determine whether the New Hampshire design defect claim was
preempted because New Hampshire determined “defect” using the riskutility test; rather, “it concluded that there was no action that the defendant
could take under that approach to increase the safety of its product without
violating the restrictions of the FDCA.”266 The court noted that Maryland
also uses both the risk-utility and consumer expectations tests in different
situations, and Bartlett applied to them similarly in both situations.267
Under both tests, regardless of what factors make the product defective,
there is still no action a generic drug manufacturer can take that would
allow it to comply with both state and federal law.268
b. In re Yasmin & Yaz (Drospirenone) Marketing,
Sales Practices & Products Liability Litigation
In In re Yasmin & Yaz (Drospirenone) Marketing, Sales Practices &
Products Liability Litigation,269 the Southern District of Illinois determined
whether federal law preempted a plaintiff’s design defect suit under Illinois
law.270 In In re Yasmin, a plaintiff alleged that she suffered from an acute
bilateral pulmonary embolus following the consumption of a generic
version of the drug Yaz.271
The plaintiff argued that this case was distinguishable from Bartlett
because Illinois, unlike New Hampshire, used the consumer expectations
test to determine defect.272 However, the court disagreed, holding “this is a
distinction without a difference.”273 The court stated that “the two tests are
not separate theories of liability, but rather two different ways whereby a
plaintiff can prove the same ground of liability—unreasonable

263. See id. at 473. Akathisia is a disease characterized by feelings of restlessness and
muscular quivering. See Akathisia, STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY (27th ed. 2000).
264. See Drager, 741 F.3d at 478.
265. See id.
266. Id.
267. See id.
268. See id.
269. No. 3:13–cv–10143–DRH–PMF, 2014 WL 1632149 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 24, 2014).
270. See id. at *7–*9.
271. See id. at *1. Acute bilateral pulmonary embolus is a disease characterized by
obstructions in the lung’s arteries. See Pulmonary embolism, STEDMAN’S MEDICAL
DICTIONARY (27th ed. 2000).
272. See In re Yasmin, 2014 WL 1632149, at *9.
273. Id.
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dangerousness.”274 The court held that whether the risk-utility or consumer
expectations test is used does not change the content of the duty required
under state law “because the two tests are simply alternative methods” of
proving breach of duty, rather than the content of the duty.275
c. Fullington v. PLIVA, Inc. (Fullington II)
After the Eighth Circuit in Fullington I held it was uncertain whether
design defect claims under Arkansas law were preempted after Bartlett,276
on remand the Eastern District of Arkansas in Fullington v. PLIVA, Inc.277
(Fullington II) determined whether federal law preempted a plaintiff’s
design defect suit against a generic drug manufacturer under Arkansas
law.278
In determining this issue, the court acknowledged the holding in Drager
and emphasized that Drager held that the Court in Bartlett did not find that
federal law preempted state law because it used the risk-utility test; rather, it
held that federal law preempted state law because the defendant could not
act in compliance with both state law and FDA regulations.279 Following
this acknowledgement, the court held that Bartlett is equally applicable
under the risk-utility test and under Maryland’s consumer expectations
test.280 The court noted that the drug manufacturer cannot be forced to stop
selling the product, but also cannot change the chemical composition of the
product or the product’s labeling.281 The court expanded this holding even
further, claiming that Bartlett’s logic extends “[r]egardless of the way in
which [a state] assesses the unreasonableness of a product’s risks.”282
Ultimately, “a generic drug [must] have the same active ingredients, route
of administration, dosage form, strength, and labeling as the brand-name
drug,” and thus the generic drug manufacturer cannot change the design;
similarly, FDA rules prohibit the generic drug manufacturer from changing
its label and leave market withdrawal, which Bartlett rejected, as the only
option.283 The court held as a result that it would be impossible for a
generic drug manufacturer to comply with both state and federal law, and
“[n]one of [the] reasoning depends on the distinction between the riskutility approach and the consumer expectations approach.”284

274. Id.
275. Id.
276. See supra Part II.A.1.
277. No. 4:10CV00236 JLH, 2014 WL 806149, *1 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 28, 2014).
278. See id. at *1.
279. See id. at *3 (citing Drager v. PLIVA USA, Inc., 741 F.3d 470, 478 (4th Cir. 2014)).
280. See id.
281. See id. (citing Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, 133. S. Ct. 2466, 2575–76
(2013)).
282. Id. (quoting Drager, 741 F.3d at 478).
283. See id. (citing Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2475–78).
284. See id.
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d. Brinkley v. Pfizer, Inc.
In December 2014, approximately one and a half years after their
Fullington I decision, the Eighth Circuit once again spoke on preemption of
design defect suits against generic drug manufacturers in Brinkley v. Pfizer,
Inc.285 In Brinkley, the court determined whether federal law preempted a
design defect claim against a generic drug manufacturer under Missouri
law.286 The appellant alleged that she had suffered from tardive dyskinesia
due to her consumption of generic MCP.287
The court noted that “Missouri courts have consistently refused to
impose any judicial definition [of unreasonably dangerous] whether derived
from consumer expectations, risk-utility, or otherwise.”288 Rather, in
Missouri, “the concept of unreasonable danger . . . is presented to the jury
as an ultimate issue without further definition,” and the jury may define this
term based upon the utility and risk of the product, the consumer’s
expectations, “or any other theory of unreasonable dangerousness supported
by the evidence.”289 Due to this difference in approaches, the appellant
argued that Missouri’s “open-ended approach” to determine if a product is
defective distinguishes this claim from the claim preempted in Bartlett.290
However, the court rejected the appellant’s argument.291 The court held
that the appellant “place[d] too much weight on Missouri’s approach to
determining unreasonable danger.”292 Citing the Fourth Circuit in Drager,
the court noted that Bartlett did not find the claim was preempted because
state law applied the risk-utility test.293 Rather, the court found that the
claim was preempted because “there was no action that the defendant could
take under that approach to increase the safety of its product without
violating the restrictions of the FDCA.”294 Therefore, it had “no trouble
concluding that the same [wa]s true under either the risk-utility or the

285. 772 F.3d 1133, 1139–40 (8th Cir. 2014). Even after Brinkley, Fullington I still
appears to be good law. Within its preemption analysis, Brinkley does not specifically
overturn, or even cite, Fullington I. See id. at 1139–40. Furthermore, the courts address
federal preemption of different state laws: Brinkley addresses Missouri law, see infra note
286 and accompanying text, while Fullington I addresses Arkansas law, see supra note 218
and accompanying text. Finally, the Brinkley court stated its holding in narrow, rather than
broad, language. See Brinkley, 772 F.3d at 1141 (“Because Brinkley fails to explain how
Pliva could avoid liability under Missouri law for the alleged design defects without
changing its product, changing its labeling, or leaving the market, Brinkley’s design defect
claims—whether sounding in strict liability or negligence—‘are preempted by
impossibility.’” (quoting Drager, 741 F.3d at 476–78)).
286. See Brinkley, 772 F.3d at 1140–41.
287. See id. at 1136.
288. Id. at 1140 (alteration in original) (quoting Sappington v. Skyjack, Inc., 512 F.3d
440, 446 (8th Cir. 2008)).
289. Id. (en banc) (omission in original) (quoting Nesselrode v. Exec. Beechcraft, Inc.,
707 S.W.2d 371, 378 (Mo. 1986); Sappington, 512 F.3d at 446).
290. Id.
291. See id. at 1140–41.
292. Id. (citing Drager v. PLIVA USA, Inc., 741 F.3d 470, 478 (4th Cir. 2014)).
293. See id. (citing Drager, 741 F.3d at 478).
294. Id. (quoting Drager, 741 F.3d at 478).
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consumer-expectations approach.”295 Furthermore, the court noted that the
appellant had not proposed an action, short of stopping the sale of the
product, that the generic drug manufacturer could have taken to create a
different result.296
2. Risk-Utility Jurisdictions
Furthermore, courts have found federal law preempts design defect
claims in jurisdictions that determine defect under different risk-utility tests
than that used in New Hampshire. Part II.B.2.a discusses cases holding that
federal law preempts a design defect suit against generic drug
manufacturers where state law uses the risk-utility test with an alternative
design requirement to determine defect. Part II.B.2.b discusses a case
holding that federal law preempts a design defect suit against a generic drug
manufacturer where state law uses the prudent manufacturer test to
determine defect. Part II.B.2.c discusses a case holding that federal law
preempts a design defect suit against generic drug manufacturers where
state law uses the Restatement (Third)’s variation of the risk-utility test.
a. Safe or Safer Alternative Design
This section discusses cases in which courts have found that federal law
preempts design defect where defect is determined under a risk-utility test
that requires proof of a safe or safer alternative design.
i. Booker v. Johnson & Johnson
In Booker v. Johnson & Johnson,297 the Northern District of Ohio
determined whether the federal law preempted a design defect claim under
Georgia law.298 In Booker, the plaintiff alleged that her daughter passed
away as a result of a pulmonary embolism caused by use of a birth control
patch.299
First, the court noted that “the essential inquiry” when determining if
design defect actions are preempted is whether the state law requires an
actor to engage in certain behavior.300 The court noted that Georgia
employs a risk-utility test that “emphasize[s] that the key factor to the riskutility inquiry is whether ‘an alternative design would have made the
product safer than the original design and was a marketable reality and
technologically feasible.’”301
The court held that requiring a proof of an alternative design would
mandate that the party change the drug’s composition, which federal law

295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.

Id. at 1140–41 (alteration in original) (quoting Drager, 741 F.3d at 478).
See id. at 1141.
54 F. Supp. 3d 868 (N.D. Ohio 2014).
See id. at 872–75.
See id. at 871.
Id. at 875.
Id. (quoting Banks v. ICI Ams., 450 S.E.2d 671, 674–75 (Ga. 1994)).
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prohibits.302 Thus, federal law preempts the state design defect claim
because the defendants could not comply with state law without violating
FDA regulations.303
ii. Davis v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.
In Davis v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.,304 the Eastern District of
Louisiana determined whether federal law preempted a design defect claim
against a generic drug manufacturer under Louisiana law.305 In Davis, the
plaintiff alleged that following the use of generic levonorgestrel and ethinyl
estradiol, she developed a pulmonary embolism.306
The court first identified two prongs that a plaintiff must satisfy in order
to state a claim under Louisiana law: “that (1) an alternative design exists,
and (2) that plaintiff’s damage outweighs both the burden the manufacturer
would suffer if it were to adopt the alternative and any adverse effect of the
alternative on the product’s utility.”307 The court held that because federal
law requires the generic drug manufacturer to have the same composition
and labeling as the brand name version of the drug, and Louisiana state law
requires either additional labeling or an alternative design, federal law
preempts the Louisiana state law.308
iii. Johnson v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.
In Johnson v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.,309 the Fifth Circuit
determined whether federal law preempted a design defect claim against a
generic drug manufacturer under Louisiana law.310 In Johnson, the
appellant alleged that her use of generic MCP caused her to develop tardive
dyskinesia.311
Like in Davis, after identifying Lousiana’s two-prong test, the court held
that the state design law’s requirements that a generic drug manufacturer
either change the drug’s composition or labeling conflicted with federal
law, and therefore the federal law preempted the Louisiana state law.312
However, the appellant also argued that the state design defect suit was
not preempted because Louisiana’s design defect test law requires that a
“safer alternative product” exists and not just a “safer alternative design.”313

302. See id. (citing Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 1479 (2013)).
303. See id.
304. No. 13–6365, 2014 WL 4450423 (E.D. La. Sept. 10, 2014).
305. See id. at *3.
306. See id. at *1.
307. Id. (citing LA. STAT. ANN § 9:2800.56 (1988); Johnson v. Teva Pharmaceuticals
USA, Inc., 758 F.3d 605, 612 (5th Cir. 2014)).
308. See id. at *3.
309. 758 F.3d 605 (5th Cir. 2014).
310. See id. at 612–13.
311. See id. at 609.
312. See id. at 612–13.
313. Id. at 613.
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However, the court refused to answer this claim because the appellant did
make this allegation in her complaint.314
b. The Prudent Manufacturer Test
In Strayhorn v. Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,315 the Sixth Circuit
determined whether federal law preempted a design defect claim under
Tennessee law.316 In Strayhorn, the appellants alleged that their use of
generic MCP caused them to develop tardive dyskinesia.317
The court noted that under the prudent manufacturer test, a court engages
in a risk-utility analysis.318 The court then held that because the factors that
a jury considers in a risk-utility test only enabled a generic drug
manufacturer to avoid liability under state law by changing the drug’s
composition or warning, federal and state law conflicted.319
c. Restatement (Third) Section 6(c): Products Liability
On February 28, 2011, ninety-one different plaintiffs from twenty-eight
different states filed a design defect suit in a Missouri state court, alleging
in part that they suffered bone fractures from their use of generic
alendronate sodium.320 After removal to federal court, the U.S. Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation “centralized the action with several other
Fosamax[]-related lawsuits in a multi-district litigation” in the District
Court of New Jersey, which found that federal law preempted the plaintiffs’
claims.321 The plaintiffs appealed to the Third Circuit.322
In In re Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Products Liability Litigation
(No. II), the Third Circuit determined whether federal law preempted these
multi-district litigation design defect claims.323 The appellants pled design
defect claims under the risk-utility theory proposed in section 6(c) of the
Restatement (Third).324 The court held that because federal law prohibited
the generic drug manufacturer from changing the drug’s design or label, and
because the appellants could not identify any other action that the
defendants could take to comply with both state and federal duties, federal
law preempted state design defect law.325

314. See id.
315. 737 F.3d 378 (6th Cir. 2013).
316. See id. at 397.
317. See id. at 383.
318. See id. at 397 (quoting Brown v. Crown Equip. Co., 181 S.W.2d 268, 282–83 (Tenn.
2005)).
319. See id. (citing Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2475–76
(2013)).
320. In re Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. II), 751 F.3d 150 (3d
Cir. 2014).
321. Id. at 155.
322. See id. at 153.
323. See id. at 158–65.
324. See id. at 158 n.16.
325. See id. at 164.
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The court also analyzed the respondents’ argument that courts need to
engage in a state-by-state analysis in light of Bartlett.326 The court held that
such an analysis would be unnecessary, as under the laws of the twentyeight states at issue, the generic drug manufacturers’ only options would be
to change the labeling, change the design, or stop selling the product.327
C. Commentary
The scholarship on this issue supports the claim that, in light of Bartlett,
federal law preempts design defect lawsuits against generic drug
manufacturers.
James Beck argues that theories that attempt to distinguish tests for
defect are “red herring[s].”328 He argues that there are no options allowed
under federal law or the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence that a generic drug
manufacturer can take regardless of the test for defect that a jurisdiction
uses.329 He contends that a generic drug manufacturer may only avoid
design defect liability by changing the drug’s label or design, which federal
law prohibits, or through withdrawing the drug from the market, which
Bartlett rejected.330 Because there are no further options available for a
generic drug manufacturer to take, he argues that all design defect claims
are preempted.331
Beck supports the reasoning in Fullington II, claiming that the court there
“asked the right question”:
“[W]hat [could] the [generic drug
manufacturers] . . . have done to comply with [state] law without violating
federal law[?]”332 Beck claims that because there is no positive answer,
federal law preempts state design defect claims regardless of whether the
test for defect is risk-utility with alternative design, risk-utility without
alternative design, or consumer expectations.333 “As long as any theory
would require a change in design, [it is] preempted because that requires
prior FDA approval.”334

326. See id.
327. See id. at 164 n.30.
328. James M. Beck, Bullseye, DRUG & DEVICE L. (Aug. 19, 2013, 1:20 PM),
http://druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com/2013/08/bullseye.html
[http://perma.cc/C2N63GEK].
329. See id.
330. See id. (citing Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2471, 2477
(2013)).
331. See id.
332. James M. Beck, Breaking News—Consumer Expectations Test Preempted, DRUG
& DEVICE L. (Mar. 4, 2014, 5:00 PM) (third alteration in original) (quoting Fullington v.
PLIVA, Inc., No. 4:10CV00236 JLH, 2014 WL 806149, *4 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 28, 2014)),
http://druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com/2014/03/breaking-news-consumer-expectations.html
[http://perma.cc/TME5-MGXZ].
333. See id.; Beck, supra note 328.
334. Beck, supra note 332.
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Beck similarly agrees with the court’s analysis in Drager.335 Beck called
Drager “the first court of appeals to face this false distinction head on and
identify this non-issue for what it is.”336 Beck argues that Drager correctly
pointed out that “[i]f the result of a verdict is that, to avoid liability under
state law, the defendant would have to violate FDA regulations requiring
[a]gency pre-approval of any alteration of the product’s design, then state
law is preempted as ‘impossible’ to enforce in the face of supreme federal
law.”337
Futhermore, Beck agrees with the court’s analysis in In re Fosamax.338
Beck argues that the In re Fosamax court was correct because the appellants
could not articulate a theory of liability that did not depend on the generic
drug manufacturers changing the drug’s warning, changing the drug’s
design, or stopping the sale of the product.339
Beck also rejects the court’s analysis in Hassett.340 Calling the result
“jaw-dropping,” Beck argues that the Hassett court erred in referring to
absolute liability and strict liability interchangeably.341 According to Beck,
the dissent was correct to point out that the majority opinion “almost
entirely lack[ed] in legal reasoning and violates the mandate that the courts
‘must adhere to extant Supreme Court jurisprudence.’”342
Similarly, Beck rejects the court’s analysis in Neeley.343 Beck argues
that Neeley wrongly distinguished strict liability consumer expectations
claims from strict liability risk-utility claims in the preemption analysis
because ultimately the generic drug manufacturer cannot change the design
under federal law.344
Finally, Steve McConnell rejects the Illinois Appellate Court’s analysis
in Guvenoz.345 Calling Guvenoz a clear case of “a court wearing its judicial
335. James M. Beck, Progress on Design Defect Preemption, DRUG & DEVICE L. (Jan.
31, 2014, 5:00 PM), http://druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com/2014/01/progress-on-designdefect-preemption.html [http://perma.cc/E6FJ-VUBU].
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. James M. Beck, Breaking News—Third Circuit Holds Generic Fosamax Claims
Preempted, DRUG & DEVICE L. (Apr. 30, 2014, 1:11 PM), http://druganddevicelaw.
blogspot.com/2014/04/breaking-news-third-circuit-holds.html
[http://perma.cc/X2VECXKU].
339. Id.
340. James M. Beck, Can’t Blame Philadelphia for These, DRUG & DEVICE L. (July 30,
2013, 5:01 PM) [hereinafter Beck, Can’t Blame Philadelphia], http://druganddevicelaw.
blogspot.com/2013/07/cant-blame-philadelphia-for-these.html
[http://perma.cc/44ALC9BB]; James M. Beck, The Bad and the Ugly—The Worst Prescription Drug/Medical
Device Decisions of 2013, DRUG & DEVICE L. (Dec. 23, 2013, 8:16 AM) [hereinafter Beck,
The Bad and the Ugly], http://druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com/2013/12/the-bad-and-uglyworst-prescription_23.html (ranking Hassett the fourth worst prescription drug/medical
device case of 2013) [http://perma.cc/3EWK-JVRE].
341. Beck, Can’t Blame Philadelphia, supra note 340.
342. Beck, The Bad and the Ugly, supra note 340 (quoting Hassett v. Dafoe, 74 A.3d 202,
218 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) (Platt, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)).
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Steve McConnell, Illinois Appellate Court Misapplication of Bartlett Preemption:
The Monster Case of the Week, DRUG & DEVICE L. (Apr. 1, 2015, 7:30 AM),
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heart on the sleeves of its judicial robes,” McConnell argues that the
Guvenoz court’s attempt to distinguish that case from Bartlett ignored the
preemption principles stated therein.346
III. FEDERAL LAW REIGNS SUPREME
As the Bartlett majority explicitly recognized, the first step in
determining whether the FDA regulations preempt a state design defect suit
is to determine the content of the state duties.347 However, courts have
frequently failed to do so, possibly in an attempt to defy Bartlett and allow
design defect claims against generic drug manufacturers to continue despite
FDA regulation.348 This determination of the content of the state duties is
fundamental in determining whether there is a feasible possibility—besides
changing a generic drug’s chemical composition, changing a generic drug’s
labeling, or stopping the sale of the product altogether—that would allow
the generic drug manufacturer to comply with both their federal and state
duties.349 Such a finding would prevent a court from concluding that the
state design defect suit is preempted under physical impossibility conflict
preemption.350
This part illustrates how federal law preempts state design defect claims
against generic drug manufacturers regardless of the test the state court uses
to determine defectiveness. First, Part III.A discusses the failure of courts
to properly identify the content of the duties imposed by state design defect
law after Bartlett. Then, Part III.B evaluates the content of state law duties
under the various different design defect tests and discusses its
ramifications, if any, on the subsequent physical impossibility analysis, as
elaborated by Bartlett.
A. Identification of State Duties
This section identifies deficiencies in the approaches that the Neeley,
Hassett, and Guvenoz courts have taken with respect to the identification of
the content of state duties. Part III.A.1 argues that Neeley failed to evaluate
the defendant’s duties under state law. Part III.A.2 argues that Hassett
incorrectly engaged in its analysis of the state duties. Part III.A.3 argues
that Guvenoz also incorrectly engaged in its analysis of the state duties.
1. Neeley Failed to Undertake an Analysis of the State Duties
In Neeley, the court failed to properly identify the duties that Arkansas
design defect law actually imposed upon a generic drug manufacturer. In
Neeley, the District Court relied on the Eighth Circuit’s determination in
http://druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com/2015/04/illinois-appellate-court-misapplication.html
[http://perma.cc/46Z4-4PNM].
346. Id.
347. See supra notes 184–86 and accompanying text.
348. See supra Part II.A; supra notes 247–50 and accompanying text.
349. See supra notes 198–208 and accompanying text.
350. See supra notes 198–208 and accompanying text.
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Fullington I that “it is not immediately clear” that federal law preempted
Arkansas’s design defect law, which applies a consumer expectations test,
because Bartlett’s preemption analysis was with respect to New Hampshire
design defect law, which follows a risk-utility test.351 While Fullington I
ultimately remanded that determination to the District Court, Neeley merely
cited Fullington I and engaged in no further analysis.352
This deference to Fullington I is defective for two reasons. First, the
Fullington I court remanded the actual analysis of state duties to the district
court; it was the district court in Fullington II that engaged in the state
duties analysis.353 Thus, the Neeley court had made this non-preemption
determination without itself analyzing the state duties, or deferring to a
court that had made such an analysis. Second, as shown below in Part
III.B.1, jurisdictions determining defect under a consumer expectations
analysis are preempted in light of the Court’s analysis in Bartlett.354
2. Hassett Improperly Engaged in an Analysis of the State Duties
In Hassett, the court failed to properly identify the duties that
Pennsylvania design defect law actually imposed upon a generic drug
manufacturer. The Hassett court found that federal law did not preempt the
design defect claims because the state design defect law did not actually
impose any duty upon the generic drug manufacturer.355 However, this is
an inaccurate portrayal of Pennsylvania law and strict liability.
Hassett correctly held that a claim imposing true absolute liability on
generic drug manufacturers would not be preempted after Bartlett,356 but
incorrectly held that Pennsylvania design defect law imposed true absolute
liability. Under true absolute liability, a court will not look to the condition
of the product when determining whether the manufacturer is liable.357 By
contrast, under strict liability regimes, the evaluation of defectiveness,
whether it be under a risk-utility test, a consumer expectations test, a
hybrid, or any new derivation that should arise, is a determination of
whether the generic drug manufacturer breached its duty under state law.358
By requiring “defect” to be found before a defendant becomes liable, a
court determines whether the manufacturer did in fact fail to adhere to a
legal duty to design a product without “defect,” regardless of how “defect”
may be defined or interpreted, so long as it requires the generic drug
manufacturer not to produce a product in a certain non-conforming
condition.359 Bartlett has explicitly stated that this duty is to be viewed as a
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legal requirement.360 Because this duty is a legal requirement, and because
that requirement under state law makes it impossible for a generic drug
manufacturer to comply with federal law, federal law must preempt state
law.361
3. Guvenoz Improperly Engaged in an Analysis of the State Duties
In Guvenoz, the generic drug manufacturer had received FDA approval,
but following new information, the FDA dropped its approval of the
drug.362 Based largely upon those facts, Guvenoz held that because the
plaintiffs alleged that there was no way that the drug could have been
altered to be safely produced, there was no requirement that conflicted with
federal law.363
The Guvenoz court failed to properly engage in a state duties analysis
because it looked to the content of the drug, rather than the content of state
law. As shown in Bartlett, a court determines the content of the state duty
by determining what actions the party must undertake in order to avoid
liability.364 However, the analysis does not look to whether an individual
party can in fact comply with its state duty due to its own particular
circumstances.365 Impossibility preemption requires a court to determine
what the law requires a party to do, not what is feasible for a party to do
under its unique circumstances.366
B. Physical Impossibility and Different Defect Tests
As shown above, the determination that a product is defective is a
determination of whether a state law duty has been breached.367 Under
Bartlett, federal law preempts state law under physical impossibility
preemption when the state duty required by design defect law forces a
behavior contrary to federal law’s “sameness” requirement towards generic
drug manufacturers and where the only option for the generic drug
manufacturer to avoid liability is to stop the sale of the drug completely.368
Any test for defect—whether it be through the risk-utility test’s variations,
the consumer expectations test, a hybrid, or any new variation—will still
require the generic drug manufacturer to engage in behavior that leaves
“stop selling” as the only viable alternative.369 State design defect claims
of any jurisdiction that require a finding of defectiveness, no matter the

360. See supra notes 187–88 and accompanying text. This Note does not address the
validity of this assumption.
361. See supra notes 187–88, 201–08 and accompanying text.
362. See supra notes 255–56 and accompanying text.
363. See supra notes 257–59 and accompanying text.
364. See supra notes 184–97 and accompanying text.
365. See supra notes 184–97 and accompanying text.
366. See supra notes 76–97 and accompanying text.
367. See supra notes 92–93, 155–56 and accompanying text.
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369. See infra Part III.B.1–4.
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content of the test, will therefore be preempted by federal generic drug
regulations.370
This section more carefully analyzes these distinctions between
jurisdictions and applies preemption principles to these differences. Part
III.B.1 discusses preemption of design defect suits against generic drug
manufacturers in consumer expectations jurisdictions.
Part III.B.2
discusses preemption of design defect suits against generic drug
manufacturers in risk-utility test jurisdictions with an alternative design
requirement. Part III.B.3 discusses preemption of design defect suits
against generic drug manufacturers in prudent manufacturer test
jurisdictions. Part III.B.4 discusses preemption of design defect suits
against generic drug manufacturers under the Restatement (Third)’s test.
Finally, Part III.B.5 discusses preemption of design defect suits against
generic drug manufacturers under a true absolute liability regime.
1. Consumer Expectations
Post-Bartlett, federal law preempts design defect claims against generic
drug manufacturers in jurisdictions that determine defectiveness via the
consumer expectations test. As established above, a jurisdiction that
determines defectiveness under a consumer expectations test will ask a jury
to determine what a reasonable consumer would expect regarding the safety
of the product.371 This ultimately imposes a duty on generic drug
manufacturers in such jurisdictions to design the generic drug to be as safe
as a reasonable consumer would expect it to be.372
In order to avoid preemption in these jurisdictions, a plaintiff must show
that there is some behavior that the generic drug manufacturer can engage
in which would not expose the generic drug manufacturer to liability, other
than refraining from selling the drug.373 Thus, this invites the critical
question: How may a generic drug manufacturer alter a consumer’s
expectations regarding the safety of a generic drug without changing the
drug’s warnings, changing the drug’s actual composition, or stopping the
sale of the drug completely?
Because they properly follow the word of Bartlett, courts like the
Fullington II court are correct when they hold that there is in fact no other
route that a generic drug manufacturer can take with regard to the design of
its product to avoid liability, without refraining from selling the drug.374 As
correctly noted in In re Yasmin, while the risk-utility test and consumer
expectations tests allow a reasonable person to consider different factors to
determine whether the design is “defective,” ultimately, the only way that
the generic drug manufacturer would be able to change the reasonable
consumer’s expectations would be to change the drug’s composition,
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
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change its labeling, or stop selling the product.375 No court has yet to
accept any theory as to any further option that the generic drug
manufacturer could undertake to avoid liability.376
2. Risk-Utility Test Requiring a Safe or Safer Alternative Design
Jurisdictions that require the finding that there exists a safe or safer
alternative design under a risk-utility test before a breach of duty can be
found are preempted following Bartlett. Jurisdictions that impose such a
requirement may only have valid claims when a generic drug manufacturer
feasibly could have distributed its drug to the public by some alternative
method that would have allowed the product to be deemed “safe,” or
“safer” than its present state.377
As stated in Booker, Davis, and Johnson, the alternative design
requirement, where implemented, is a part of the risk-utility test.378 Despite
the fact that in some jurisdictions, as in Booker, alternative design will be a
factor (albeit a large one in the risk-utility test) and in some jurisdictions,
like in Johnson and Davis, it consists of one prong, both should be
preempted similarly.379 Ultimately, by determining defectiveness under
any risk-utility test, these jurisdictions all impose a duty upon the
manufacturer, much like the New Hampshire law in Bartlett, to design
products that are reasonably safe.380 Regardless of the factors used to
evaluate what is “reasonably safe” in the risk-utility test, the only way the
generic drug manufacturer could change a reasonable person’s evaluation of
these factors would be to change a drug’s composition, change the drug’s
labeling, or refrain from selling the drug.381
3. Prudent Manufacturer Test
Federal law preempts design defect suits in jurisdictions applying the
prudent manufacturer test after Bartlett. These jurisdictions apply a riskutility test, but assume that defendants knew of the product’s condition.382
The attribution of knowledge to the manufacturer plays no additional role
in the analysis of state law duties after Bartlett. The knowledge
requirement serves to impute an understanding of the risks of the drug upon
the manufacturer,383 but like the traditional risk-utility test, while different
factors or considerations may ultimately identify whether the generic drug
is safe, the ways in which the generic drug manufacturer can alter the
perception of these factors can solely be accomplished by changing the
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composition, changing the labeling, or ceasing sale of the product.384 The
hindsight test might ultimately change the standard that a judge instructs to
a jury,385 but it offers no additional option as to how a drug manufacturer
can avoid liability besides the option rejected in Bartlett.386
4. Section 6(c) of the Restatement (Third)
Federal law preempts design defect claims where the test for defect is
designated by Section 6(c) of the Restatement (Third). Ultimately, a
generic drug manufacturer can only avoid state liability under this test when
the benefits are greater than the risks for some class of person.387 The
benefits and risks, as seen in Bartlett, can only be altered by changing the
drug label, changing the drug composition, or stopping the sale of the
drug.388
5. True Absolute Liability Regimes
As Hassett stated, Bartlett suggests that design defect claims in true
absolute liability regimes remain viable.389 The application of this theory is
in fact viable, because true absolute liability regimes, unlike strict liability
regimes, do not impose duties upon manufacturers.390 Rather, because they
find liability regardless of whether the manufacturer produced a defective
product, they do not impose any duty on the manufacturer at all, because
the law does not require the manufacturer to provide a reasonably safe
product.391
In Bartlett, the majority found that the “requirement” imposed by state
tort law equated to the duty imposed by state tort law.392 Without such a
duty, however, there cannot be a “requirement” imposed by state law.393
Thus, the state duty necessary to find physical impossibility conflict
preemption would not exist, leaving the absolute liability design defect
claim not preempted under Bartlett.394 When there is no state requirement,
logically there cannot be conflicting federal and state standards.395
CONCLUSION
Unfortunately for consumers of FDA-approved drugs, state strict liability
design defect claims against generic drug manufacturers are preempted no
matter which test for defect is used. Ultimately, the legal formulation for
384.
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defect, no matter how defect is defined, will only be able to be altered by
changing the drug’s label, changing the drug’s composition, or having the
drug company refrain from selling the drug at all. This is exactly why the
Court in Bartlett found federal law preempted a design defect claim under
New Hampshire law, and this logic applies equally to all other state design
defect laws applying strict liability principles. However, there is an
opening for design defect claims under true absolute liability regimes.
These regimes, because they do not require the finding of “defect,” do not
impose a state duty, rendering physical impossibility preemption an
impossibility.

